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Prima facie, it is not obvious how certain phenomena of central concern 
to human beings in general and to philosophers in particular can be 
accommodated within a unitary physicalist ontology. In the last half 
century, philosophers and cognitive scientists have devoted considerable 
energy and ingenuity to investigating whether and how this could be done 
for linguistic and mental phenomena. More recently, they have extended 
their investigations to social phenomena. For instance, in his 1995’s The 
Construction of Social Reality, Searle attempts to develop a general theory 
of the ontology of social facts and institutions and to show how complex 
social phenomena can be accounted for using a limited number of 
conceptual tools. Similarly, in the cognitive sciences, the subfield of social 
cognition is now the focus of considerable interest and empirical research 
in that area has grown exponentially in the last decade 
Here, I shall be concerned mainly with collective intentionality and 
what we may call Searle's dilemma. Searle seems to think that there are 
only two ways collective intentionality could be accommodated within a 
physicalist ontology: either it can be shown to reduce to individual 
intentionality or it must be considered a biologically primitive 
phenomenon. Searle argues that collective intentionality is irreducible to 
individual intentionality. Being a dedicated monist, he must go with the 
second horn of the dilemma, i.e. collective intentionality as a biologically 
primitive phenomenon. Although I agree some types of strategies for 
reducing collective intentionality to individual intentionality are doomed 
to failure, I do not think the physicalist monist is thereby forced to accept 
the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality. I will start by 
discussing Searle's account of collective intentionality and how it is 
constrained by his further commitments to individualism and to 





internalism. I will also indicate what I find the shortcomings of this 
account to be (sections 1 and 2). In section 3, I will discuss Bratman’s 
alternative account of collective intentionality. I will argue that it avoids 
some of the shortcomings of Searle’s account, and is also immune to the 
objections Searle addresses to reductive analyses. Yet, one objection to 
Bratman's account is that it over-intellectualizes collective intentionality 
and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents. In the 
fifth section, I will discuss the capacities needed to sustain collective 
intentionality and try to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman’s 
account in a cognitively more parsimonious way. In the last section, I will 
briefly examine what becomes of Searle’s requirements of individualism 
and internalism on this account.  
1. Searlian intuitions 
In his 1995 book, The Construction of Social Reality, Searle sets out to 
show how complex social phenomena can be accounted for using a 
limited number of conceptual tools. His theoretical apparatus comprises 
four main elements: The first three — the assignment of agentive 
functions, collective intentionality, and constitutive rules — are 
introduced and described in the first chapter of the book. The fourth 
element, what Searle calls the Background, is introduced later in the book 
to explain the causal functioning of institutional structures.  
Of the three conceptual tools introduced in the first chapter of the 
book, collective intentionality is probably the most central. Collective 
intentionality is indeed a defining feature of social facts since, for Searle 
(p. 26), any fact involving collective intentionality qualifies as a social 
fact. In contrast, agentive function is not criterial of social facts as there 
can be singular as well as collective assignment of agentive functions on 
objects. As for constitutive rules, they are involved only in one special 
subclass of social facts, namely institutional facts. Despite its centrality, 
collective intentionality is characterized rather cursorily in The 
Construction of Social Reality and,  for a more detailed account of this 
notion, one must revert to an earlier paper of Searle’s (Searle, 1990).  
Searle’s view of collective intentionality is based on two main 
intuitions. The first intuition — that there is collective intentional behavior 
as distinct from individual intentional behavior — is hardly controversial. 
Searle offers two reasons for thinking that collective intentional behavior 
is not the same as the summation of individual intentional behavior. The 






set of individual acts and on another occasion constitute a collective 
action. Searle illustrates this point by way of the following example: 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in 
a park. Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to 
a common, centrally located shelter. Each person has the intention 
expressed by the sentence "I am running to the shelter". But for each 
person, we may suppose that his or her intentions is entirely independent 
of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case there is no collective 
behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happens to 
converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people 
in a park converge on a common point as a piece of collective behavior. 
Imagine that they are part of an outdoor ballet where the choreography 
calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common point. We can 
imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable  in the 
two cases; the people  running to the shelter make the same types of 
bodily movements as the ballet dancers. Externally observed, the two 
cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly internally different. 
(Searle, 1990: 402-403) 
The problem then is to specify what this internal difference consists in. 
One important clue is that in the first situation the convergence on a 
common goal is a mere accident. The intention and behavior of each 
individual is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of others. 
Moreover, as Searle remarks, this is so even if each person knows that the 
other people intend to run to the shelter and knows that the other people 
know that he or she intends to run to the shelter. Searle claims that in the 
second situation, by contrast, the individual “I intend” are derivative from 
the “we intend”. The second reason for thinking that collective intentional 
behavior is not the same as the summation of individual intentional 
behavior is that “often the derived form of an individual intention will 
have a different content from the collective intention from which it is 
derived” (Searle, 1990: 403). The example Searle gives is that of a 
football team trying to execute a pass play. No individual member of the 
team can have “we are executing a pass play” as the entire content of his 
intention, for no one can execute a pass play by himself. Each player will 
must make a specific contribution to the overall goal.  
Searle’s second, more controversial, intuition is that collective 
intentions, what he calls we-intentions, cannot be analyzed into sets of I-
intentions, even supplemented with beliefs, including mutual beliefs about 
the intentions of other members of a group. Notice that this claim is much 
stronger than the mere claim that collective intentional behavior is 
different from the summation of individual intentional behavior. The 





claim is that no analysis of collective intentions in terms of individual 
intentions is forthcoming whatever their combination is, whatever their 
contents are, and whatever other individual mental states they are 
supplemented with. Searle acknowledges that he cannot prove that no 
such analysis could ever succeed, but he claims that all reductive analyses 
that he has seen are subject to obvious counter-examples. The next section 
will consider what motivates Searle’s introduction of we-intentions and 
whether the construal he offers of this notion should be accepted. 
2. What are we-intentions? 
According to Searle, reductive analyses fail to account for the cooperative 
and coordinated character of collective intentionality. More precisely, 
reductionist strategies, such as Tuomela and Miller’s (1988), try to account 
for the cooperative dimension of collective actions in terms of mutual 
beliefs among members of a group. What Searle shows through counter-
examples is that the existence of mutual beliefs is not sufficient to ensure 
cooperation. Thus, business school graduates who have been exposed to 
Adam Smith’s theory of the hidden hand may come to believe that the best 
way for somebody to help humanity is by pursuing his own selfish 
interests. Each may form a separate intention to thus help humanity by 
pursuing his own selfish interests and not cooperating with anybody and 
they may all have mutual beliefs to the effect that each has such an 
intention. In such a case, despite all the businessmen having the same goal 
as well as mutual beliefs about their respective intentions, there is no 
cooperation and no collective action. What they lack is an intention to 
cooperate mutually. Mutual beliefs among members of a group do not 
ensure the presence of such an intention.  
According to Searle, this cooperative dimension of collective actions 
can be captured only if it is accepted that the intentions attributable to the 
individuals that take part in collective actions are different in type from 
the intentions attributable to those same individuals when they engage in 
individual actions. The idea then is that to account for cooperation we 
have to introduce a specific type of mental states: we-intentions. But in 
what sense are intentions special and in what sense can they be said to 
imply cooperation? Prima facie, three possibilities are conceivable. First, 
it might be that their contents are what makes we-intentions special and 
thus that the dimension of cooperation is linked to specific features of 
these contents. Second, what makes we-intentions special could have to 
do with the type of entities they can be attributed to. The third possibility 






is the psychological mode itself — i.e., the fact that the psychological 
mode is that of we-intending instead of I-intending — that implies the 
notion of cooperation. Before we examine each possibility in turn, let me 
note that they are not mutually incompatible: we-intentions could in 
principle be special in all three ways.  
The first possibility is that we-intentions are special in that their 
contents have specific features not shared by I-intentions. One could then 
claim that what is specific of the content of a we-intention is that I-
intentions, related in a certain way, are embedded in it. To borrow Searle’s 
example of two cooks, say Paul and Gilbert, preparing a hollandaise sauce 
together, the content of the we-intentions would be something like (that 
this collective intention causes Paul to have the I-intention to stir while 
Gilbert is pouring and Gilbert to have the I-intention to pour while Paul is 
stirring). According to this conception, what would make we-intentions a 
sui generis type of mental states are certain unique features of their 
contents, namely that further intentions fall within their scope, and what 
would capture the dimension of cooperation would be the way those 
embedded intentions are related. This is not the option Searle favors. 
Searle thinks such an analysis cannot be right for two reasons. First, 
because it would involve attributing two separate intentions to each agent, 
for instance in the case of Paul a we-intention to prepare the sauce and an 
I-intention to stir. Second, because the we-intention of each agent would 
have to be an intention to make it the case that he have a singular 
intention. Searle is not explicit why he thinks that these consequences of 
the analysis are unacceptable. Of course, on such an analysis, the structure 
of collective intentions would depart from the structure of individual 
intentions, but it is not obvious, to me at least, what is wrong with that.  
What Searle proposes instead is that the content of collective 
intentions is of a form already present in some complex cases of singular 
intentions. Namely, the content of the intention encompasses a by-means-
of relation. The idea is that in the case of singular intention of, e.g., firing 
a gun by pulling the trigger, there is only one intention and one action, 
with the relation of the means-intention to the overall intention being only 
part-whole. Similarly, for Searle, in the case of collective actions, there is 
only one complex: the singular intentions of the agents are related to the 
collective intentions as means to ends and this relation of the singular 
intentions to the collective intention is simply part-whole. It is important 
to note that there is nothing in the by-means-of relation per se that implies 
cooperation. For instance, I can intend that we go to the police station by 
means of me dragging you, and clearly in such a case no cooperation need 
be involved. Thus, there is nothing in the analysis Searle offers of the 





form of the content of collective intentions that makes it necessary that the 
dimension of cooperation essential to collective intentions be reflected in 
their contents. Indeed, Searle insists that: “The real distinction between the 
singular and the collective case is in the type of the intention involved, not 
in the way that the elements in the conditions of satisfaction relate to each 
other” (1990: 412). 
Let us now turn to the second possibility, namely that the specificity of 
collective intentions is related to the type of entities we-intentions can be 
attributed to. The idea here is that whereas I-intentions are typically 
attributed to individuals, there are further constraints an entity must meet 
for we-intentions to be attributable to it. This move can be made in two 
different ways. One is to admit the existence of some forms of primitive 
collective entities, such as group minds, collective consciousnesses, or 
Hegelian world spirits. Primitive here means that those entities are 
conceived as sui generis and not as constructions assembled from more 
elementary entities (in the way, say, that molecules are collections of 
atoms assembled in a certain way). Searle, quite reasonably in my view, 
sees the existence of such entities as widely implausible. He intends his 
account of collective intentionality to be consistent with methodological 
individualism, that is with the fact that society consists of nothing but 
individuals and that all the intentionality there is in the minds of 
individuals. Thus, it will not do to say that collective intentions form a 
specific type of states insofar as they are the privilege of primitive 
collective entities. 
But there is also another move that can be made. Instead of saying that 
we-intentions are to be attributed to primitive collective entities, one could 
suggest that the proper bearers of we-intentions are individuals related in a 
certain way both among themselves and with their environment. Of course 
for such a strategy to be successful, the relations that must obtain among 
individuals for them to qualify as bearers of we-intentions would have to 
be describable in a non-circular way. It other words, it should not be the 
case that the ability to enter into such relations presupposes collective 
intentionality. Whether a non-circular account of these intersubjective 
relations is feasible is something we shall consider in the next section. It 
should be noted however that Searle would reject this kind of move. 
Searle is a dyed-in-the-wool internalist and he wants his account of 
collective intentionality to meet a further constraint besides 
methodological individualism. Not only does he insist that all 
intentionality be in individual minds or brains, he also maintains that all 
the intentionality an individual has could be had by this individual even if 






account of collective intentionality to meet the following constraint: “It 
should be consistent with the fact that the structure of any individual's 
intentionality has to be independent of the fact of whether or not he is 
getting things right, whether or not he is radically mistaken about what is 
actually occurring” (1990: 406). The reason why adherence to this 
constraint is incompatible with pursuing the strategy just described should 
be rather obvious. For a relation to obtain, the relata must exist. But to 
say, as Searle does, that I could have all the collective intentionality I have 
if I were a brain in vat, is to say that I could have all the collective 
intentionality I have even if there existed no other individuals for me to be 
related to.  
Thus, the only possibility left open for Searle is the third one, namely, 
that what makes we-intentions special is the psychological mode itself, not 
the possible subjects of we-intentions nor their contents. Searle also wants 
his view of collective intentionality as a primitive form of intentionality to 
satisfy the two constraints of individualism and internalism. Indeed, the 
reason why he rejects some alternative proposals is that they flout either 
individualism or internalism. He maintains that these two constraints are 
in fact rather easily satisfied. In order to see that his conception of 
collective intentionality as primitive is consistent with individualism, it is 
enough, according to Searle, to “note that all the intentionality needed for 
collective behavior can be possessed by individual agents even though the 
intentionality in question makes reference to the collective” (1990: 407). 
And to see that it is consistent with internalism, it suffices to note that
“collective intentionality in my head can make a purported reference to 
other members of a collective independently of the question whether or 
not there actually are such members” (1990: 407). 
This analysis appears less than satisfactory for at least two reasons. 
First, Searle's contention that a single individual, even if he happens to be 
a brain in a vat, can have collective intentionality seems difficult to 
understand. Searle himself acknowledges that his analysis has an 
uncomfortable feature. Namely: 
[I]t allows for a form of mistake that is not simply a failure to achieve the 
conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state and is not simply a 
breakdown in the Background. It allows for the fact that I may be 
mistaken in taking it that the “we” in the “we intend” actually refers to a 
we, that is, it allows for the fact that my presupposition that my 
intentionality is collective may be mistaken in ways that go beyond the 
fact that I have a mistaken belief. [...] on my account, it turns out that I 
can not only be mistaken about how the world is but am even mistaken 
about what I am doing. If I am having an hallucination in supposing that 





someone else is helping me push the car, that I am only pushing as part of 
our pushing, then I am mistaken not only in my belief that there is 
somebody else there pushing as well but also about what it is that I am 
doing. I thought I was pushing as part of our pushing, but that is not in 
fact what I am doing. (1990: 408) 
It seems to me that this admission of Searle’s clearly contradicts his 
claim that his analysis of collective intentionality is consistent with 
internalism, i. e., consistent with the fact that all intentionality, whether 
collective or individual, could be had by a brain in a vat or a set of brains 
in vats. For what exactly is the special form of mistake Searle is referring 
to in the passage just quoted? Searle says that the hallucinating individual 
is mistaken about what he is in fact doing. How should we understand this 
claim? Searle (1983) identifies an action not just with a series of bodily 
movements, but with the bodily movements together with the intention in 
action that causes them.1 Clearly it is not just the case that the 
hallucinating individual is mistaken about the kind of bodily movements 
he is performing, for this individual could be right that he is actually 
pushing the car and yet be mistaken in supposing that someone else is 
helping him. So in saying that the individual is mistaken about what he is 
in fact doing, Searle presumably means that he is mistaken about the kind 
of intention in action he has. Searle says that the individual may be 
mistaken in taking it that the “we” in the “we intend” actually refers to a 
we. But what could this mean other than that what the individual assumes 
                                                 
1 Searle (1983) proposes a distinction between two types of intentions, what he 
calls intentions-in-action and prior intentions. In his terminology, a “prior intention” 
corresponds to the initial representation of the goal of the action prior to the 
initiation of the action, whereas an intention in action is the proximal cause of the 
physiological chain leading to overt behavior. Prior intentions and intentions in 
action are said to differ in their contents. Searle claims that whereas the content of 
intentions in action presents physical movements, the content of prior intentions 
represents whole actions, that is, not just a physical movement, but the causal 
sequence consisting of the intention in action causing the physical movement. 
Moreover, Searle points out that the content of an intention of action is much more 
determinate than the content of a prior intention, meaning that my intention in 
action to raise my arm, for instance, will include not only that my arm goes up, but 
that it goes up in a certain way, at a certain speed, etc. According to Searle, 
another important difference between prior intentions and intentions in action that 
not all intentional actions have prior intentions in actions but all intentional actions 
have intentions in action, where an intention in action does not simply trigger 
bodily movements but plays a continuing causal role in shaping them, guiding and 






to be a collective intention in action is not actually a genuine one? What 
could this mean other than that the hallucinating individual is deluded in 
thinking that he has a we-intention. For Searle’s analysis to be consistent 
with internalism it would have to be the case that a brain in vat can have 
genuine collective intentions, not just it can think it has. But if the brain in 
a vat is wrong in thinking that it has a collective intention, then clearly it 
doesn't have one. Therefore, it seems that, contrary to what Searle claims, 
his analysis is not consistent with internalism. An individual cannot 
properly be said to have a collective intention unless other individuals 
actually share his intention.  
A second problematic feature in Searle’s analysis has to do with the 
dimension of intersubjectivity, a dimension that is glossed by Searle in 
terms of agreement and cooperation. Recall that, according to Searle, the 
businessmen pursuing their own selfish interests in order to help humanity 
would have constituted a case of collective intentionality if they had all 
got together on graduation day and agreed to so act. Recall also, that 
according to Searle, what the Tuomela-Miller analysis fails to account for 
is the notion of cooperation that is built into collective action. But does 
Searle's analysis fare any better? Nothing in the structure of the content of 
we-intentions as laid out by Searle seems to capture the notion of 
cooperation. As we have already noted, there is nothing in the by-means-
of relation per se that implies cooperation. I can intend that we go to the 
police station by means of me dragging you, and clearly in such a case no 
cooperation need be involved. So how does cooperation enter the stage? 
According to Searle, in order to account for the cooperative character of 
we-intentions, we must appeal to Background capacities. What collective 
intentionality presupposes is “a Background sense of the other as a 
candidate for cooperative agency; that is, it presupposes a sense of others 
as more than mere conscious agents, indeed as actual or potential 
members of a cooperative activity” (1990: 414). Now, Background 
capacities, according to Searle, are not themselves representational. 
Rather, they are a set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that 
enable intentional states of function. In other words, they are biological or 
neurophysiological phenomena rather than intentional phenomena. As 
Fisette (1997) points out, by drawing a line between the realm of the 
intentional and the Background, and by considering that the dimension of 
cooperation is part of the Background, Searle acknowledges that he 
cannot account for it in intentional terms. From this it follows that a 
theory of collective intentionality cannot per se provide a conceptual 
foundation for the social sciences. If cooperation is indeed an essential 
dimension of social phenomena, and cooperation is part of the 





Background, providing a conceptual foundation for the social sciences is 
ultimately a job for the biologist, not for the philosopher.  
To sum up, I disagree with Searle on two counts. First, to insist that an 
account of collective intentionality should meet the constraint of 
internalism seems to me close to an absurdity. It is one thing to claim that 
all the intentionality there is, including collective intentionality, is in the 
head of individuals. It is another to insist that collective intentionality 
could be had by a single individual, not to mention a brain in vat. The first 
claim is at least plausible, the second seems to me unintelligible. Second, 
while there is no denying that our cognitive capacities rest on an 
underlying basis of biological capacities, it appears to me unduly hasty to 
sweep cooperation under the rug of Background presuppositions. 
Although a capacity for cooperation may depend in part on certain 
background biological capacities, I think it can also be construed in part in 
intentional terms. These two difficulties with Searle's account are not 
unrelated. It is, I think, Searle's adherence to internalism that prevents him 
from seeing how cooperation can be accounted for, at least in part, in 
intentional terms.  
3. Bratman’s alternative proposal 
In this section, I will briefly present and discuss a different proposal, put 
forward by Bratman (1992), which I think fares better with regard to the 
elucidation of the main features of collective intentionality.2 Bratman 
agrees with Searle that collective intentional behavior is not analyzable as 
just the summation of individual intentional behavior even supplemented 
by mutual beliefs or mutual knowledge. Yet contrary to Searle, he thinks 
that collective intentionality is not a primitive phenomenon and that a non-
circular reductive analysis may be possible. Bratman (1992) identifies 
three features of shared cooperative activities that such an analysis would 
have to account for. The first feature is the mutual responsiveness of each 
participating agent to the intentions and actions of the others. The second 
is a commitment to a joint activity. The third is a commitment to mutual 
support by which each agent is committed to supporting the efforts of the 
                                                 
2 Bratman (1992) points out that some actions may be jointly intentional yet not 
cooperative. He therefore considers Searle's claim that collective intentionality and 
collective actions imply cooperation as too strong. To refer to cooperative 
collective actions, Bratman speaks of shared cooperative activities. When, for the 
sake of brevity, I speak of collective intentions or actions in this paper, I always 






other agents to play their role in the joint activity. None of these features 
is by itself sufficient to make an activity a shared cooperative activity, but, 
according to Bratman, taken together these three features are characteristic 
of shared cooperative activities.  
Bratman is careful to ensure that his analysis is non-circular. In this 
regard the notion of a commitment to a joint activity may seem suspect. 
First, it may appear that cooperation is built into the notion of a joint 
activity. Bratman, however, is careful to distinguish joint act types that are 
cooperatively neutral from those that are cooperatively loaded. For 
instance, we can go to New-York together without our activity being 
cooperative. He makes it clear that in his analysis the feature of 
commitment to a joint activity should be read in a cooperatively neutral 
way. Second, one may wonder whether it makes sense to appeal to my 
intention that we do something together, insofar as it may be thought that 
one can only intend one's own actions. Here, Bratman introduces a 
distinction between intending and attempting and defends a planning 
conception of intentions that emphasizes the role of future-directed 
intentions as elements of partial plans.3 This conception of intentions 
allows him to be more liberal about what can be intended than about what 
can be attempted since references to things other than our own actions can 
function appropriately in our plans.  
Since Bratman construes commitment to a joint activity in a 
cooperatively neutral way, this commitment does not suffice to ensure that 
the activity that follows is a shared cooperative activity or a collective 
action in Searle's sense. The originality of Bratman’s analysis comes from 
                                                 
3 Bratman’s (1987) theory of intentions emphasizes the role of intentions in 
planning and reasoning. Intentions are not only terminators of practical reasoning, 
they are also prompters of practical reasoning. This is what Bratman calls the 
reasoning-centered dimension of the commitment to action characteristic of 
intentions. Intentions play an important role as inputs into further practical 
reasoning, as, e. g., means-ends reasoning, reasoning from more general to more 
specific intentions, or reasoning as to which other intentions are consistent with a 
given intention. They are thus “typically elements in larger plans, plans which 
facilitate coordination both socially and within our own lives, plans which enable 
prior deliberation to shape later conduct” (1987: 28). Bratman’s distinguishes 
between future-directed intentions —concerned with future courses of action — 
and present-directed intentions — intentions to act in a certain way beginning 
now. Obviously, the reasoning-centered dimension of commitment is 
characteristic of future-directed intentions. Most of the practical reasoning the 
agents engages in, will occur prior to the time of action. Future-directed intentions 
are thus central in his theory. 





the way in which he construes the two further features of mutual 
responsiveness and commitment to mutual support. These are analyzed in 
terms of meshing subplans and interdependent intentions. For an activity 
to be a shared cooperative activity, it must be the case that each agent 
intends that the group performs this joint action in accordance with 
subplans that mesh, where for subplans to mesh it is not necessary that 
there be full agreement in the agents’ subplans, but merely that there be 
some way the action can be done that would involve the successful 
execution of those individual subplans. For instance, if John and Mary 
intend that they paint the house together, but Mary intends that they paint  
it red all over, and Peter that they paint it blue all over, then their 
respective subplans concerning the color of the paint don’t mesh. If, by 
contrast, Peter intends that they paint the house blue all over but has no 
preference as to where they should buy the paint, whereas Mary does not 
care about the color but intends that they buy the paint at a particular 
store, then their respective subplans mesh. This meshing of subplans in 
turn implies that the intentions of the participating agents must be 
interlocking. Each agent should bring into the content of his intention the 
efficacy of the other participants' intentions as well as the efficacy of his 
own intentions.  
By thus requiring that the intentions of the participating agents be 
interlocking, Bratman moves away from the classical reductive analyses 
of collective action according to which the crucial link among the attitudes 
of the participating agents is simply cognitive. Mutual belief or mutual 
knowledge is not sufficient to ensure that intention is shared or collective; 
but neither is it necessary to posit collective intentionality as a primitive 
form of intentionality. What is crucial is the specific form of 
interdependence of the individual intentions. Finally, insofar as the 
intention of each participant includes his intending that the relevant 
intentions of the others be successfully executed, commitment to mutual 
support is also involved in shared cooperative activities. As Bratman 
phrases it, the intentions of the participants should be minimally 
cooperatively stable. In other words, there must be at least some 
circumstances in which each participant would be prepared to help the 
others do their part in the joint activity.  
These conditions essential for shared cooperative activity are 
summarized by Bratman (1992: 338) in the following way: 
Where J is a cooperatively neutral joint-act type, our J-ing is a 
shared cooperative activity only if: 






(1) (a) (ii)  I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 
meshing  subplans of (1) (a) (i) and (1) (b) (i). 
(1) (b) (i)  You intend that we J. 
(1) (b) (ii)  You intend that we J in accordance with and because 
of meshing subplans of (1) (a) (i) and (1) (b) (i). 
(1) (c)  The intentions in (1) (a) and (1) (b) are minimally 
cooperatively stable. 
(2)  It is common knowledge between us that (1) 
 
Here, conditions (1) (a) (i) and (1) (b) (i) are meant to capture the feature 
of commitment to a joint activity; Conditions (1) (a) (ii) and (1) (b) (ii) to 
capture the feature of mutual responsiveness, and condition (1) (c) the 
feature of commitment to mutual support.  
Bratman’s analysis appears to me more satisfactory than Searle’s. It 
does not lay open to the criticism Searle addresses to traditional reductive 
analyses of collective intentionality since it does not maintain that the 
crucial link among the attitudes of agents involved in collective behavior 
is a purely cognitive link. It brings to the fore three essential features of 
shared intentions, that are not taken into account by traditional analyses. 
Finally, contrary to Searle, it tries to capture what is distinctive of shared 
intentions in terms of a special kind of interdependence of the individual 
intentions of the participants, rather than by postulating a mysterious form 
of primitive collective intentionality supposed to be in the head of 
individual agents.  
Earlier, I distinguished three different ways in which we-intentions 
could be conceived as special. According to the first, what makes we-
intentions special are features of their contents, according to the second 
what makes them special has to do with the type of entities they can be 
attributed to, and, according to the third, what is special is the 
psychological mode itself. We have seen that the option favored by Searle 
was the third one. I think Bratman's position can be characterized as a mix 
between the first and the second option. According to Bratman, the 
contents of the intentions of individuals involved in collective action are 
special insofar as they make reference to the intentions of the other 
participants — each agent must have intentions in favor of the efficacy of 
the intentions of the others — and are reflexive as well — each agent must 
have intentions concerning the efficacy of their own intentions.
4  But 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that whereas for Searle all intentions, whether individual or 
collective involve a kind of self-referentiality, Bratman thinks that self-
referentiality is a feature specific of collective intentional actions.  





collective intentions seem also to be special insofar as they can only be 
attributed to individuals related in a certain way. Indeed, Bratman’s choice 
of words provides a good indication. He does not speak of collective 
intentions, but rather of shared intentions. Trivially, for an intention to be 
shared, there must be at least two individuals to share it. Thus, on 
Bratman’s view, the idea that a brain in a vat could have a collective 
intention is simply incoherent. A brain in a vat, even if the content of his 
intention makes purported reference to the intentions of purported others, 
does not have a collective intention. To speak of a collective intention, it 
is necessary that the intentions of each participant mesh with the 
intentions of the others, hence that there exist others. In other words, as he 
puts it, “it takes at least two not only to tango but even for there to be a 
shared intention to tango” (Bratman, 1993: 103, n. 17) 
Despite its illuminating character, Bratman's analysis is not totally 
unproblematic. The condition of mutual knowledge he proposes is 
difficult to satisfy and one may wonder whether such a strong condition is 
really necessary. In particular, if one supposes that mutual explicitation of 
intentions and plans requires resorting to verbal communication, it 
becomes doubtful whether an analysis such as Bratman’s could really be 
useful with regard to Searle’s general project. For Searle, a capacity for 
collective behavior is a condition of possibility of the institution of 
language, and not vice-versa, even though of course, language makes 
possible new forms of collective behavior. If we think that the satisfaction 
of Bratman’s mutual knowledge condition requires resorting to language, 
we cannot without circularity substitute his analysis of shared intention to 
Searle's while preserving Searle’s general explanatory project. 
A second limitation of Bratman’s analysis, at least relative to Searle’s 
overall project, is that the characterization he offers seems tailored to 
forms of shared cooperative activities that are quite sophisticated. 
Bratman's analysis focuses on future-directed intentions that involve 
rational deliberation and conscious planning. It also requires that the 
participating agents have concepts of mental states and meta-
representational capacities, since they must have intentions in favour of 
the efficacy of their own intentions and of the intentions of others. In 
contrast, Searle’s analysis is pitched at the level of intentions in action. 
Searle considers that many species of animals, besides human beings have 
a capacity for collective intentionality, which he sees as presupposing a 
set of Background capacities that do not themselves consist in intentional 
phenomena but are rather biologically primitive phenomena. One may 
therefore wonder whether there isn’t some middle ground left to explore 






human planning capacities and Searle’s vision of collective intentionality 
as a biologically primitive phenomenon. 
4. What are the capacities needed for collective intentions 
and actions? 
One way to approach this question is to investigate the kinds of cognitive 
capacities one must attribute to an agent for her to be able to be a 
participant in collective actions. This investigation may enable us to do 
two things. First, we may be in a position to offer a more detailed 
articulation of the kind of capacities Searle locates in the Background, 
where these capacities may be characterized at least in part in 
psychological terms rather than directly in biological terms. Second, this 
may help us define a notion of mutual accessibility of intentions less 
demanding than Bratman’s requirement of mutual knowledge. Obviously, 
it would be impossible to do justice in the space of a few paragraphs to the 
enormous literature already available. What I hope to do is simply to give 
some idea of the kinds of investigations potentially relevant to a 
characterization of the cognitive capacities that underlie collective 
intentionality.  
I shall focus on two essential capacities and their interplay. The first is 
a capacity for planning. Collective action presupposes a capacity for 
coordinating one's own intentions and actions with those of the other 
participating agents. However, as Bratman’s (1987) work shows, this 
capacity for planning and coordination is not required solely for collective 
action. Even in the case of individual actions, intrapersonal coordination is 
needed. In particular, individual intentions and actions are subject to 
consistency constraints. First, plans must be internally consistent: the 
intentions that are the constitutive elements of a plan must be mutually 
consistent, for it to be possible that the entire plan be successfully 
executed. Second, plans must also be “externally consistent”, that is 
consistent with the beliefs of the agents about the world she is in. Third, 
there is also a demand for means-end coherence: the means chosen must 
be adapted to the end pursued and, although plans are initially typically 
partial, they must be appropriately filled in as time goes by.  
Bratman is mainly concerned with future-directed intentions and thus 
with forms of high-level planning. But planning and coordination take 
place at a number of levels, from the basic level of simple motor 
commands up to conscious deliberation about plans. For instance, work in 
the cognitive neuroscience of action shows that even actions as simple and 





seemingly automatic as eye saccades are controlled by sets of predictive 
mechanisms that allow for an internal simulation of eye movements in the 
absence of overt saccades and thus allow for a selection to be made among 
alternative actions (Berthoz, 1996). Of course the neural mechanisms that 
control eye-saccades are low-level mechanisms whose workings are not 
consciously accessible. Therefore, by Searle’s standards, the types of 
simulations they carry out would not count as mental simulations: we are 
in the domain of the non-intentional, biological capacities that for him 
belong to the Background.  
Yet, there are intermediate levels of planning between those that 
depend on these low-level neural mechanisms and the high-level 
capacities considered by Bratman. Of particular interest are those levels of 
planning through simulation that can give rise to conscious experience and 
thus to what is called motor imagery. According to researchers working 
on motor imagery (Decety & Ingvar, 1990; Decety, 1996, Jeannerod, 
1994, 1997), the same neurophysiological mechanisms subserve both 
imagined and actually executed actions. There is thus a close relationship 
between motor imagery and what Searle (1983) calls the experience of 
acting — that which gives us a conscious access to the intentional content 
of our intentions in action. As emphasized by Jeannerod (1994), the 
experimental study of motor imagery may thus be a perspicuous way of 
investigating the contents of intentions in action and of clarifying both 
what their elements are and how they are encoded
5. Moreover, the study 
of motor imagery may shed light on a form of planning that is pitched at 
the level of intentions in action. Thus, the existence of a capacity for 
conscious motor simulation may be a key to understanding how some 
forms of intrapersonal as well as interpersonal coordination can be 
achieved. Of course this capacity will ultimately depend on more 
primitive capacities that are non-intentional and can only be characterized 
in purely neurophysiological terms, but it would be premature to claim 
that all the capacities needed for collective intentionality belong to the 
Background.  
A second capacity that one must possess in order to participate in 
collective actions is a capacity to understand the actions and intentions of 
other agents and to predict their behavior on that basis. How this capacity 
should be construed is currently the object of much debate. On the one 
hand, theory theorists maintain that in order to impute mental states to 
                                                 
5 For much more detailed discussions on how work in the cognitive neuroscience 
of action can shed light on issues in the philosophy of action, see Pacherie, 2000, 






herself and others an individual must possess a body of knowledge about 
cognition and motivation that is theory-like. On the other hand, the 
simulationist approach contends that such a capacity can be construed as a 
capacity to imaginatively identify with someone else and to imagine the 
situation the person is in. One important difference between the two 
approaches is that on the theory-theory view to engage in folk-
psychological practice one must possess psychological concepts such as 
the concepts of belief, desire or intention, whereas on the simulationist 
approach, such conceptual mastery may not be required. On the latter 
view, it may be enough, for instance, that by imaginatively identifying 
with someone else, one imaginatively believes (desires, intends, …) this 
or that. There are at present various versions of each approach as well as 
hybrid variants that take the two approaches to be complementary rather 
than rival.6   
Recent empirical research seems to provide evidence in favor of the 
simulationist approach. The so-called mirror neurons first discovered by 
Rizzolatti and his group in Parma in the monkey's premotor cortex 
(Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Di Pellegrino et al. 1992). respond both when a 
particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same 
action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons thus 
appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of 
goal-directed motor-action. Single neuron recording is an invasive 
technique not used in humans. Several studies using non-invasive 
techniques have yielded evidence for the existence of a similar mirror 
matching system in humans (for a review, see Rizzolatti et al., 2002). 
Brain imaging experiments in humans have shown an important overlap 
between brain areas activating during action execution and action 
observation. For instance, during hand action execution and observation, a 
cortical network involving sectors of Broca’s region, premotor cortex, STS 
region and posterior parietal cortex is activated  (Decety et al., 1994; 
Grafton et al., 1996; Grèzes and Decety, 2001 ; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; 
Stephan et al., 1995, Buccino et al. 2001). Although evidence for mirror 
mechanisms in humans is only indirect, the important overlap between 
areas activated during action execution and during action observation 
strongly suggests that many frontal and parietal structures have mirror 
properties.
7 
                                                 
6 On this debate, see for instance, Davies & Stone, 1995a, 1995b, Carruthers & 
Smith, 1996 and Goldman, 2006. 
7 It is important to note that mirror systems understood in a wide sense involve 
more than just mirror neurons. They may include further mechanisms that exploit 





As suggested by Gallese and Goldman (1998), one possible function 
of these structures may be to enable an organism to detect certain mental 
states of observed conspecifics. This function may be part of, or a 
precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability relying on a capacity to 
adopt a simulation routine.8  
A general discussion of the debate between theory theory and 
simulation theory falls beyond the scope of this paper and my purpose 
here is certainly not to try to adjudicate between the two approaches and 
their various versions. Rather, my point is that the existence of such 
philosophical and psychological theorizing shows that rather than directly 
appealing to a biologically primitive sense of the other person as a 
candidate for shared intentionality, one can usefully investigate the nature 
of the psychological mechanisms that enable human beings to attribute 
mental states to others and to see things from their perspective.  
It should be noted that neither of the two capacities just discussed — a 
capacity for planning and coordination and a capacity for mind-reading — 
is specifically tied to collective action. Both capacities are already 
involved in individual behavior. Yet, for collective intentionality to be 
possible, it must be the case that these two capacities are integrated and 
thus work together. In particular, this integration is necessary for the 
interlocking of intentions which, according to Bratman, is a central 
characteristic of shared intentions. In other words, for shared cooperative 
activity to be possible, it is not enough that each individual be capable of 
attributing to the other participants intentions similar to his own. It is also 
necessary that (1) each agent be capable of imagining both the third-
person information available to the other agents in the situation considered 
and their first-person orientation toward this situation, (2) that each agent 
be capable of imagining the third-person information and the first-person 
orientation that the others attribute to him, and (3) that each agent be 
capable of repeatedly switching perspective in order to reach interpersonal 
coordination.
9 Presumably, the integration of planning and mind-reading 
                                                                                                     
mirror neuron resources together with information from other origins. In this paper 
however, we will be concerned only with mirror neurons, their contents and 
functions. We therefore distinguish between mirror systems (broad sense) and 
mirror neuron systems (narrow sense). 
8 But  see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005 for a critique of  the motor theory of social 
cognition. 
9 It may well be objected that these requirements are too strong. Indeed, it doubtful 
whether certain social animals capable of collective actions — a pack of wolves 
performing collective hunting, for instance — are endowed with such 






capacities requires a fair amount of cognitive resources, including a 
capacious working memory and a relatively sophisticated level of 
executive function. Yet, once again those working memory and executive 
function capacities are not specifically tied to collective intentionality, 
they are also involved in a number of cognitive activities, such as 
problem-solving, that are not essentially linked to collective behavior.  
What this brief sketch of the kind of capacities involved in collective 
intentions and actions is meant to suggest is that, in order to account for 
the capacity to engage in collective behavior, one does not need to appeal 
(at least in the first instance) to brute biological Background capacities 
specifically dedicated to cooperative agency. An explanation can be 
couched in terms of the psychological endowment of human beings, 
where the psychological capacities appealed are not specifically dedicated 
to the production of collective behavior but fulfill a number of roles in the 
cognitive life of human beings. This discussion of the capacities 
underlying collective intentionality and action may also help see how to 
replace Bratman's requirement of mutual knowledge, which seems to 
require explicit communication, with the weaker requirement of mutual 
presumption. Mutual presumption is the implicit assumption that other 
human agents are sufficiently cognitively similar to us that their attitudes 
and intentions can be successfully simulated or inferred. Because such a 
                                                                                                     
beings engage in collective action, those capacities are at play. Here, it may be 
useful to draw a distinction between the kinds of (individual or collective) actions 
that are part of the repertoire of a given species and are to some degree 
preprogrammed, and those that need to be learned. Another useful distinction is 
between learning in the sense of assembling a new action program and learning in 
the sense of adjusting parameters in a preexisting action program. Presumably, 
human beings learn how to drive a car in the first sense, but they learn how to 
walk only in the second sense. Now, it may be suggested that collective hunting in 
wolves is part of the innate repertoire of the species. If such is the case, it is 
certainly superfluous to attribute to them the kind of imaginative and perspective-
taking capacities just listed, it is probably enough that they be able to exploit 
certain environmental and behavioral cues that are associated with given steps in 
the action program. Even given a prepackaged action program, wolves may have 
to learn how to hunt collectively, but then only in the second sense of learning 
how to adjust certain parameters. By contrast, it seems to me that learning novel 
types of collective actions requires the integration of planning and mind-reading 
capacities, even if, once those new forms of collective actions are well-practiced, 
the exploitation of behavioral cues may suffice for successful performance.  In any 
case, if collective intentionality is to be used as a conceptual tool for explaining 
social and institutional facts, we should surely focus on the forms of collective 
intentionality that can give rise to novel types of collective actions.     





presumption can be mistaken, our intentions regarding collective actions 
are fallible, in other words, they are themselves presumptive. If follows 
that the actual existence of shared intentions is not something that can or 
should be established with certainty prior to the action itself. What 
warrants the reality of presumptive shared intentions is the satisfaction of 
the mutual expectations of the agents and the support given when 
problems arise. 
5. Concluding remarks 
According to the proposal put forward here, it is neither the case that 
collective intentionality is reducible to individual intentions in the way 
classical analyses suggest, nor that it is a primitive form of intentionality 
backed up by specific Background capacities. Rather the specificity of 
collective intentionality lies in the interlocking character of the system of 
intentions involved. Thus, there is no need to posit a sui generis kind of 
psychological attitude, a we-intention, to account for collective 
intentionality. The common breed of intentions will do the trick, but their 
contents will be more complex than they are in the case of individual 
actions. What about Searle’s requirements that an account of collective 
intentionality must be consistent with both individualism and internalism? 
The proposal advanced here is certainly consistent with individualism. All 
the intentionality there is is in the head of individuals; no group mind or 
group consciousness need be postulated.  
The issue of internalism is more complex. Let us go back first to what 
Searle himself sees as an uncomfortable feature of his analysis, namely 
that it allows for a form of mistake that is not simply a failure to achieve 
the conditions of satisfaction of an intention but a more radical mistake 
concerning what type of state one is in. In other words, the hallucinating 
individual or the brain in a vat who thinks he is we-intending to do 
something is not only mistaken in his beliefs about the world, he is also 
mistaken in taking it that his intention is a we-intention. By contrast, the 
alternative Bratmanian analysis defended here does not allow for such a 
mistake, since it avoids postulating that the intentions possessed by agents 
involved in collective behavior are different in kind from individual 
intentions. The hallucinating individual or the brain in a vat is not 
mistaken about the type of mental state he is in. Rather he is mistaken in 
thinking that the conditions of satisfaction represented in the content of 
his intention are satisfied, insofar as it part of the content of his intention 







To answer the question whether, on the proposed account, a brain in a 
vat could have collective intentionality one must distinguish between two 
different things we may mean. On the one hand, if the question is whether 
a brain a brain in a vat could have an intention that was actually part of an 
appropriately interlocking system of intentions concerning a joint activity, 
hence an intention that was actually shared by others, then the answer is 
clearly negative for it takes at least two to share an intention. On the other 
hand, if the question is whether a brain in a vat could have an intention 
with a type of content such that it could, if circumstances were right, 
constitute an element in an interlocking system of intentions, the answer 
may well be positive. A would-be collective intention — that is, an 
intention fit to become an element in an interlocking system of intentions 
— is an intention whose content purports to refer to the intentions of other 
members of a group. Assuming one does not already have independent 
objections to internalism, this case does not create problems of its own for 
internalism and thus supplies no new grounds to reject it.  
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